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1. Introduction  
 
All countries have R&D and innovation support programs to spur growth by 
overcoming market failures. Such programs comprise a wide range of tools including 
tax cuts, subsidies for performing R&D activities, the creation of technological 
laboratories or innovative clusters. Of all these forms of public support, subsidies are in 
most countries the principal tool of public intervention.  
 
Subsidy policies aimed at enhancing the overall R&D expenditure of a given country 
can follow two different courses of action. On the one hand, they can act on the 
intensive margin, seeking to promote the R&D effort of regular R&D performers. On 
the other hand, they can act on the extensive margin, seeking to expand the base of 
R&D performers. Traditionally, subsidy policies have followed the first course of action 
(see Blanes and Busom, 2004; Aschhoff, 2008; Huergo and Trenado, 2010). Similarly, 
and possibly as a consequence, most of the research on R&D subsidies has focused on 
the intensive margin too (see the surveys by Klette et al., 2000; David et al., 2000; and 
Garcia-Quevedo, 2004).  
 
This lack of interest in “extensive” subsidies is hard to understand for one main reason. 
It is only those countries with a substantial share of R&D firms that achieve high R&D 
intensities (see Figure 1). So even if the final goal is to increase R&D intensity it must 
necessarily be achieved through expanding the number of R&D firms. Countries acting 
on the intensive margin alone are unlikely to meet the European Commission's target of 
spending 3% of GDP on R&D. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
Our goal is to study whether there is scope for using “extensive” subsidies to expand the 
share of R&D firms of a given country. At the limit all firms could be subsidized but 
this would be costly and not necessarily welfare enhancing. So a first step is to define 
which circumstances if any justify the use of “extensive” subsidies. Our justification is 
related with the existence of sunk entry costs in R&D activities. Becoming an R&D-
performing firm is costly as it often requires setting up a new department, hiring and 
training researchers and investing in machinery. These outlays are generally non-
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recoverable and can be considered as sunk costs. As a result of the existence of sunk 
entry costs, some firms are likely to need subsidies to start but not to continue 
performing R&D. We defend that “extensive” subsidies should essentially be used to 
smooth out the sunk entry costs of these firms.  
 
We set out to detect whether such a group of firms exists in Spain, a low R&D-intensity 
country with a small share of R&D firms. We also aim to quantify the costs (total 
amount of subsidies) and benefits (total R&D stock generated) derived from inducing 
this group of firms into R&D. In short, we ask ourselves how far Spain can progress 
along the linear fit of Figure 1 with a policy based on “extensive” subsidies. 
 
To this end, we consider a dynamic model with sunk entry costs in which firms decide 
whether to start, continue or stop performing R&D on the grounds of the subsidy 
coverage (share of to-be-made R&D expenditures) they expect to receive (our model 
can be seen as a dynamic version of González et al. (2005)). Firms’ optimal 
participation strategy is defined in terms of two subsidy (or R&D) thresholds that 
characterise entry and continuation. The entry threshold is larger than the continuation 
threshold owing to the fact that firms are in greater need of aid when they lack 
experience in R&D and sunk costs still need to be paid. Whenever the expected subsidy 
coverage is above the entry (resp. continuation) threshold, firms find it optimal to enter 
(resp. continue doing) R&D. Temporary subsidies above the entry threshold can lead to 
permanent R&D activity as long as the level of subsidies remains above the 
continuation threshold. Firms with positive entry thresholds and zero or negative 
continuation thresholds can be permanently induced into R&D by means of one-shot 
trigger subsidies.   
 
Firms’ optimal participation policy can be cast in terms of a type-2 tobit specification 
with dynamics in the selection equation where firms find it optimal to enter (resp. 
continue doing) R&D if optimal R&D expenditure is above the R&D entry (resp. 
continuation) threshold. To deal with selectivity in R&D performance we implement 
Raymond et al. (2010) random effects estimator, which follows Wooldridge (2005) in 
treating the unobserved individual effects and the endogeneity of the initial conditions. 
Given that our structural model satisfies the identification restrictions highlighted in 
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Nelson (1977) we are able to recover the R&D and subsidy thresholds for every single 
firm.  
 
We estimate the model using an unbalanced panel of more than 2,000 Spanish 
manufacturing firms observed during the period 1998-2009. The dataset includes 
numerous entries into, and exits from, R&D and reports information on R&D spending. 
Somewhat unusually the dataset also contains information on both successful and 
rejected subsidy applicants, the latter information being crucial for identifying 
subsidies’ inducement effects.  
 
Subsidies are presumably endogenous as they are granted by agencies according to the 
effort and performance of firms. To deal with this problem we assume that firms react to 
subsidies expected in advance along the lines of González et al. (2005). However, we 
construct a slightly different measure of expected subsidies drawing on the information 
we have on subsidy applicants. This will enable us to control for fixed effects via the 
inclusion of Mundlak means which will ultimately result in a better identification of the 
subsidy parameters. 
 
The paper leads to a series of interesting findings. First of all, expected subsidies 
significantly affect both R&D expenditure and the decision to perform R&D. In 
addition, there is true state dependence in the sense that firms that perform R&D in a 
given period are 37% more likely than those that do not to perform R&D in the next 
period. This result implies that there are two subsidy thresholds rather than one, which 
allows for permanent inducement effects. The subsidy thresholds are used to classify 
firms according to their dependence on subsidies for making the performance of R&D 
activities profitable. Interestingly, 10% of Spanish manufacturing firms are found to 
need subsidies when they lack any previous experience, but they can persist in R&D 
without them. We estimate that inducing this group of firms would cost €110 million, 
while the yearly R&D investments that would be triggered is estimated at €453 million 
and the R&D stock generated at €2,500 million in 15 years. “Extensive” subsidies 
would move Spain from its current position in Figure 1 to somewhere between Italy and 
Ireland. 
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Our paper is most closely related to González et al. (2005) who study the effectiveness 
of subsidies at stimulating R&D performance in a setting with fixed (but not sunk) 
costs. They find that subsidies can encourage non-R&D performing firms to start 
investing in R&D but, unlike us, they are unable to tell whether firms need different 
subsidy shares to start or to continue performing R&D. In our dynamic framework with 
sunk entry costs a firm’s optimal participation strategy can be defined in terms of two 
(rather than one) subsidy thresholds characterising entry and continuation. This 
enhancement proves crucial as it allows us to detect the permanent inducement effects 
(which go unnoticed in a static setting) that make “extensive” subsidies a feasible and 
efficient tool to induce entry. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. 
Section 3 develops the analytical framework. Section 4 presents the econometric 
modeling and discusses the main identifying assumptions. Section 5 outlines the 
empirical specification and presents the estimates as well as some robustness checks. 
Section 6 discusses the policy implications of our results regarding subsidy coverage 
thresholds for R&D entry and continuation, the extent of permanent inducement effects 
and the evaluation of the costs and benefits of an extensive R&D subsidy policy. 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Data  
 
The dataset we use is the “Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales” (from now on 
ESEE)1. This survey gathers information from manufacturing firms operating in Spain 
employing more than nine workers. It is conducted on a yearly basis across twenty 
different sectors. The initial sampling undertaken in conducting the survey 
differentiated firms according to their size. While all firms employing more than 200 
employees were required to participate, firms with between 10 and 200 employees were 
selected by stratified sampling (stratification across the twenty sectors of activity and 
four size intervals). Subsequently, all newly created firms with more than 200 
                                                 
1
 The ESEE (Survey on Firm Strategies) has been conducted since 1990 by the Fundación SEPI under the 
sponsorship of the Spanish Ministry of Industry.  
5
  
employees together with a randomly selected sample of new firms with between 10 and 
200 employees have been gradually incorporated.  
 
The survey keeps track of the firms’ technological activity and reports information on 
several measures of R&D performance including intramural expenditure, R&D 
contracted with external laboratories or research entities and technological imports. For 
our purposes, a firm is classified as an R&D performer whenever it reports having 
incurred expenditure in any of these categories excluding technological imports.2  
 
In addition, the survey provides information on the R&D subsidies received by 
successful subsidy applicants. The subsidy variable we use considers the total quantity 
of aid granted by the various public agencies (primarily the national agency, CDTI, but 
also regional and European agencies). We can also identify rejected subsidy applicants 
from a question available in the ESEE since 1998 that asks firms whether they sought 
external financing without success3. Since the public sector is by far the main available 
source of external financing in Spain we can safely view firms claiming to have sought 
external R&D funding without success as rejected subsidy applicants4. This was 
confirmed by the technical director of the ESEE5. 
 
In this study, we use survey data from 1998 to 2009 6. The cleaned panel data sample 
comprises 14,283 observations corresponding to 2,621 firms observed over a varying 
number of years (see Table 1), 4,524 R&D observations, 1,585 R&D funding 
applications and 1,082 successful applications7. Approximately 2/3 of applications were 
accepted. This acceptance rate is in line with the figures found in other papers (see 
Takalo et al., forthcoming; Huergo and Trenado, 2010). Remarkably only 6% of the 
                                                 
2
 Our definition of R&D is consistent with the definition given in the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002) 
definition. 
3
 The exact question is “Did you search external R&D funding without success?”. 
4
 According to the PITEC, on average, 81% of Spanish firms’ R&D expenditures are funded with own 
internal funds while 16.7% are funded with public funds (both from Spanish and European 
administrations) and only 2.3% come from other sources. So almost all external funding comes from the 
public sector.  
5
 The technical director of the ESEE told us that their internal checks clearly suggest that the outcomes of 
the question “Did you search external R&D funding without success?” can be used to infer whether firms 
applied for subsidies without success.  
6
 We do not use previous years because information on subsidy applicants, which is key to identifying the 
subsidies inducement effects, is only available since 1998. 
7
 To obtain the cleaned dataset we have simply deleted data points for which relevant variables are 
missing. We have also deleted some observations with subsidies higher than R&D expenditures that are 
not consistent with our empirical modeling.  
6
  
subsidies are granted to firms that did not perform R&D in the previous period. This 
suggests that subsidies are mainly targeted at active R&D firms and very rarely used to 
encourage entry into R&D.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
Table 2 shows the importance of having data on funding applications to study the 
subsidies inducement effects. While all successful applicants perform R&D, only 72% 
(63% of firms that continue plus 9% of entrants) of rejected applicants do so. 
Interestingly, 24% of rejected applicants fail to enter into R&D and 4% are forced to 
abandon R&D presumably due to the lack of financing. This group of rejected 
applicants would have performed R&D had it received subsidies. This suggests that 
subsidies do have some inducement effects.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
Table 3 provides an initial insight of the extent to which firms engage in R&D activities 
as well as of the stylised facts governing the assignment of subsidies to R&D 
performers. A marked stylised fact is that the proportion of R&D performers increases 
greatly with size. Whereas, in most years, only around 20% of firms with fewer than 
200 workers perform R&D, this percentage rises to 70% when we consider firms with 
more than 200 workers. Similarly, the proportion of subsidized firms among R&D 
performers increases with firm size. Whereas only 10% to 25% of R&D performers 
with fewer than 200 workers enjoy subsidies, 25% to 39% of R&D firms with more 
than 200 workers receive subsidies. As for the subsidy coverage (ratio of subsidy to 
R&D expenditure), this adopts a mean value of 34% for firms with fewer than 200 
workers, falling to 25% in the case of firms with more than 200 workers8. Hence, the 
proportion of subsidized R&D expenditure declines with firm size.  
 
Interestingly, there is a sharp increase in the percentage of subsidized R&D performers 
from 2004 onwards coinciding with a change in the Spanish government (from 
conservative to socialist party). However, the average number of R&D firms and the 
                                                 
8These numbers are valid for the subsample of R&D firms only. The average subsidy coverage is much 
lower for the entire sample (see Table 4A in the Appendix). 
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average subsidy coverage remain unaltered. This confirms that the government sought 
to increase R&D expenditures by focusing on the intensive margin (i.e., subsidizing 
active R&D firms). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
Table 4 differentiates between stable and occasional R&D performers and provides 
more detail on the probability of a firm undertaking R&D and being granted a subsidy. 
It appears that stable R&D performance, understood as performing R&D during the 
whole sample period, is mainly observed in large firms and that it is quite uncommon 
among small firms. By contrast, occasional performance is more evenly distributed 
among firms of different sizes, being most common among medium-sized firms. If we 
focus solely on R&D performers, the probability of being granted a subsidy increases 
markedly with firm size and stable performance.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
 
3. Analytical framework 
 
In this section we present a stylized analytical setting that illustrates how public 
subsidies modify firms’ optimal R&D decisions (whether to perform R&D and how 
much to invest). We will then draw on this set up to build our empirical specification.  
 
3.1. Demand 
We consider a product-differentiated market with monopolistic competition in which 
firms produce a single type of each variety of good. These varieties are symmetrically 
differentiated, with common elasticity of substitution 1>σ  between any two of them. 
The demand for firm i’s output, itq , is generated by a representative consumer that 
spends a fixed amount of income Y  on the products of the industry. The utility function 
is of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type augmented to accommodate the consumer’s 
valuation9: 
                                                 
9
 The consumer’s valuation is introduced in line with Melitz (2000).  
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where )(U  is assumed to be differentiable and quasi-concave and itΛ  represents the 
consumer’s valuation of firm i  product. Utility maximization gives demands of the 
form: 
 
1),( −− Λ=Λ σσ itittititit pzpq  (2) 
 
where ititit ppp
~
=  is the deflated price, itp  is the nominal price, 
( )[ ] σσ −−∑ Λ= 11)1(~ ititit pp is a quality-adjusted price index (a price deflator) and
 
ittit pYz ~=  captures exogenous demand shifters. Firms are considered too small 
relative to the industry to influence the aggregate p~ -index10 and so competitive 
interaction among firms can be ignored, thereby keeping the analysis relatively 
straightforward.  
 
In line with other papers (see González and Jaumandreu, 1998; Sutton, 1991; and Levin 
and Reiss, 1988), it is assumed that the consumers’ valuation of a given product 
depends on its quality, which can be improved through R&D expenditure. 
Consequently, the consumers’ valuation is allowed to take the following functional 
form: δτ )]([ −=Λ ititit xs  in which its  stands for product quality, τ−itx  denotes R&D 
expenditure and δ  is the elasticity of the consumers’ valuation with respect to quality. 
R&D investments affect product quality according to the relation φ ττ −− = ititit xxs )(  where 
1<φ  is the elasticity of quality with respect to R&D11. Notice that we are assuming that 
R&D does not immediately improve product quality but rather that it takes τ  periods to 
become effective12. Quality is assumed to be constant at 1=s  if no R&D investments 
                                                 
10
 Then, the elasticity of demand with respect to price equals – . 
11
 It is assumed that R&D is subject to diminishing returns to scale.  
12
 Mansfield et al. (1971) report a median lag from R&D to innovation of about three years. Ravenscraft 
and Scherer (1982) cite survey responses from companies stating that 45% reported a typical time lag 
between the beginning of development and the first introduction of a new product of one to two years, 
40% reported a lag between two and five years and 5% a lag of more than 5 years. 
9
  
are made. Hence, firm i  demand is φε τσ −−=Λ itititititit xpzpq ),(  if it performs R&D and 
σ−
=Λ ititititit pzpq ),(  if it does not, where δσε )1( −=  is the elasticity of demand with 
respect to quality.13 Demand can also be expressed in a more compact way as follows: 
φε
τττ
σ )}0{1}0{1(),(
−−−
− >+==Λ itititittititit xxxpzpq . 
 
3.2. Two-period problem without sunk costs 
Before presenting the dynamic problem with sunk costs we first consider a simpler two-
period setting that will serve to introduce many of the concepts we will use throughout. 
In this two-period setting firm i might choose to invest in R&D at t. If it does, then it 
reaps the benefits at τ+t . Alternatively it might prefer not to invest in R&D. In such a 
case it gets standard non-R&D profits at τ+t . We assume that for every euro spent on 
R&D each firm can expect to get a rebate [ ]1,0∈eitρ  from the government. Hence, eitρ  is 
the expected share of subsidized R&D expenditure, something we shall later refer to as 
the subsidy coverage14. Also, let tE  be the expectations operator, parameter β
 
stands 
for the discount factor, itc  represents marginal cost and itf  R&D fixed costs. Then, the 
expected gross operating profits of R&D performers are obtained by simultaneously 
choosing the price and the level of R&D expenditure that solve the following problem15:  
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The first-order conditions lead to optimal price and R&D expenditure  
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13
 It seems sensible to assume that  is below the unity. This assumption is met if	  
	

. 
14
 We model subsidies as a share of to-be-incurred R&D expenditures. This modeling is consistent with 
most subsidy granting schemes in Europe (see the 2006/C 323/01 issue of the Official Journal of the 
European Union for more details).  
15
 Note that no equation has been specified for R&D capital stock formation. This is because we assume 
that only current R&D investments affect quality (or, what amounts to the same, that R&D capital fully 
depreciates from one period to the other). While not particularly realistic, this assumption ensures that the 
dynamic problem remains tractable. Marginal costs are assumed not to vary with the quantity produced.  
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where τσσσττ σσ +−−−++ −= ititit zcA 11 )1( . Plugging expressions (4) and (5) into the profit 
function gives rise to optimal current period profits, which turn out to be increasing in 
expected subsidies eitρ  and demand conditions τ+itz , and decreasing in marginal costs 
τ+itc  and fixed costs itf : 
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Proceeding analogously for the situation in which no R&D expenditures are incurred, it 
is immediate to obtain:  
 
].[)],([ & ττττ βpi +++ = ittititDNoRitt AEzcE  (7) 
 
The optimal participation rule is that the firm is R&D-active only if the profits 
generated by R&D are greater than the profits earned when not doing R&D. Because 
only equation (6) depends on subsidies, an optimal participation policy of this type can 
be characterized in terms of a threshold defined as the value of the subsidy for which the 
firm remains indifferent between performing R&D or not, that is, for which )7()6( = :   
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All firms with it
e
it ρρ ~≥  will self-select into R&D activities. Note that while eitρ  can 
only take values between 0 and 1 (as it is defined as the expected fraction of R&D 
expenditure covered by the subsidy), the threshold subsidy is fixed between minus 
infinity and one, ]1,(~ −∞∈itρ , depending on the parameter values. Notice that the 
threshold subsidy is a negative function of τ+itz , ε  and φ , while it is a positive function 
of τ+itc , itf , σ  and τ . Hence, firms with favourable demand shifters, high elasticity of 
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quality with respect to R&D, high elasticity of demand with respect to quality, low 
marginal costs, a low elasticity of demand with respect to price (large market power) 
and short lags between R&D and profits should be less dependent on subsidies. Zero or 
negative thresholds denote that firms find it profitable to perform R&D no matter what 
their expected subsidies. By contrast, positive thresholds denote firms that rely on 
sufficiently large expected subsidies to engage in R&D. Given our assumptions and our 
modeling of subsidies as a share of to-be-made R&D expenditures all firms can be 
induced into R&D with a sufficiently large eitρ . This is reasonable because even firms 
operating in very unfavourable conditions (with 1~ =itρ ) will find it profitable to 
perform R&D if all expenditures are subsidized ( 1=eitρ ).  
 
Since R&D expenditure increases monotonically in the expected subsidies (see equation 
(5)), for any subsidy threshold itρ~  there will exist a unique R&D threshold
)~(~ * ititit xx ρ= . This implies that the optimal policy can be recast in terms of R&D 
expenditures. Plugging (8) into (5) we get the R&D threshold:  
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The optimal decision is to perform R&D when itit xx ~
* ≥ . Notably, eitρ  enters the optimal 
R&D equation (5) but not the R&D threshold (9). This will prove crucial for 
identification of the thresholds in the empirical exercise. We will expand on this issue 
later.  
 
3.3. Dynamic setting: problem with sunk costs 
Now, let us suppose that a sunk cost of itK  units is to be incurred every time a firm 
starts engaging in R&D.16 In such a case it is clearly more costly to enter into R&D than 
it is to persist in R&D. In Baldwin’s (1989) words, sunk costs imply that it is easier for 
firms to stay “in” than it is to get “in”. This circumstance can favour cases in which 
firms find it optimal to persist in R&D even when profit levels are lower than those that 
                                                 
16
 Sunk costs are to be incurred if a firm performs R&D for the first time but also if a firm stopped 
performing R&D for one period. In other words we assume that you cannot keep your R&D facilities idle. 
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could be obtained by abandoning innovative activities, since by doing so firms avoid 
future re-entry costs (Clerides et al., 1998). Thus, firms face a dynamic optimisation 
problem in which they must decide, in each period, whether to perform R&D or not on 
the grounds of their expectations over eρ , c , z  and f . Therefore, the firm will plan its 
participation in R&D activities in order to maximize its present discounted profits 
(since our interest lies on subsidies in what follows we abstract from c , z  and f  and 
simplify notation by writing )],,([)( && itititeitDRitteitDRit fzcE ττρpiρpi ++=  and 
)],([ && ττpipi ++= ititDNoRittDNoRit zcE ): 
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where ity  is a binary variable with value one if the firm performs R&D at period t  and 
value zero otherwise.17 It amounts to the same thing, and at the same time it is much 
simpler, to characterise the optimal participation policy by choosing the ty  that satisfies 
the Bellman equation corresponding to the above expression:  
 
( ) ( )[ ]
ity
ititit
DNoR
itititit
e
it
DR
itit yVEyKyV |)1()1()(ymax 1&1&it +− +−+−−= βpiρpi  (11) 
 
The profit-maximizing firm will calculate the value function for both 1=ity  and 0=ity  
and will choose the option yielding the highest value. In this kind of infinite horizon 
problem with entry costs it is well known that the optimal participation strategy can be 
characterised in terms of two threshold values defined as the realization of expected 
                                                 
17
 In such a context besides subsidies for engaging in R&D we might also consider subsidies aimed at 
lowering the sunk costs of entry. Such subsidies could be introduced within equation (10) as a lump sum 
quantity to be subtracted from  . However, there are two reasons why this might not be such a good 
idea. Firstly, sunk costs are difficult to calculate due to their somewhat tenuous nature and agencies are 
reluctant to subsidise quantities that cannot be directly observed. They rather prefer to subsidise a 
percentage of a firm’s ordinary R&D expenditure. Secondly, most of the datasets containing information 
on subsidies do not specify what the subsidies are for and simply provide an overall amount. Hence, it is 
impossible for the researcher to identify the exact nature of the subsidy and to determine whether it is 
aimed at lowering entry costs or not.    
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subsidies for which the firm is indifferent to being active and inactive18. This is due to 
the fact that the indifference condition depends on whether firms have previous 
experience in R&D. The indifference condition is given by: 
 
[ ] ititititDNoRititDRit Ky )1(~)~( 11&& −+ −=+− ρβψpiρpi  (12) 
 
where [ ] [ ])0,~|()1,~|(~ 111 =−== +++ ititittititittitit yVEyVE ρρρψ  is the discounted expected 
value of the advantage that can be enjoyed at period 1+t  by a firm that is already 
R&D-performing at period t . Baldwin (1989) refers to this advantage as an incumbency 
premium. Note that while the thresholds are implicitly defined by equation (12), there is 
no analytical expression for them. Nevertheless, provided that certain conditions hold, 
the period t  optimal entry-exit strategy can be depicted as in Figure 2. We will refer to 
the threshold values as Eitρ~  when 01 =−ity  and Citρ~  when 11 =−ity  with CitEit ρρ ~~ ≥ . The 
superscripts E and C have been chosen to reflect the fact that one threshold characterises 
“Entry” while the other characterizes “Continuation” of R&D. Accordingly, firm’s 
optimal entry-exit strategy will be to perform R&D only if Eitit ρρ ~≥   when 01 =−ity  or 
if Citit ρρ ~≥  when 11 =−ity .  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
As shown in the two-period setting without sunk costs, firms’ optimal policy can 
likewise be stated in terms of optimal R&D expenditure. Since R&D expenditure 
increases monotonically in the expected subsidies (see equation (5)), for any pair of 
subsidy thresholds Eitρ~  and Citρ~  there will exist a unique pair of R&D thresholds 
)~(~ * EitEit xx ρ=  and )~(~ * CitCit xx ρ= . Thus, the optimal decision is to perform R&D when 
E
itit xx
~* >  and 01 =−ity  or when Citit xx ~* >  and 11 =−ity , and to refrain from R&D 
otherwise. 
 
 
4. Econometric modeling 
                                                 
18
 Actually, the optimal participation strategy can be defined in terms of either of the state variables ( eρ , 
c , z
 
and f  in this case), but for our purposes it is convenient to define them as a function of eρ .  
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Econometrically, firms’ optimal participation policy can be cast in terms of a type-2 
tobit specification in which R&D expenditure *itx  is observed only when 0~
* >− Eitit xx  
for first-time R&D performers and when 0~* >− Citit xx  for continuing R&D performers. 
Assuming that the logs of *itx  and Eitx~  or Citx~ can be linearly approximated by a set of 
reduced form determinants, the tobit model is defined by the following equations19: 
 
itiititit wsubx 1111
*ln εαβγ +++=  (13) 
itiititit wyx 00001~ln εαβη +++−= −  (14) 
 
where Eitit xx ~~ =
 
when 01 =−ty  and Citit xx ~~ =
 
when 11 =−ty . As for the optimal R&D 
equation (equation (13)), )1ln( eititsub ρ−−=  , which implies that expected subsidies are 
expressed in the way they appear in equation (5). The remaining determinants of 
optimal R&D, namely the elasticities ε , φ  and σ , the marginal costs c , and the 
demand shifters z , are unobservable and need to be approximated by a set of 
exogenous or predetermined variables itw1 (this will be explained in section 5.1). 
Similarly, the thresholds are assumed to be a function of the same variables contained in 
itw1  plus a number of other variables that account for fixed costs f  in such a way that 
itw0  contains at least all the variables that appear in itw1 . In addition, as suggested by 
the analytical framework, we suspect that the threshold might take two different values 
depending on a firm’s past R&D. For this reason, we allow it to be a function of 1−ity , a 
dummy variable that takes value one if the firm performed R&D at 1−t  and zero 
otherwise. In this way, the continuation threshold is lower than the entry threshold by η
, a parameter to be estimated. We assume that the two thresholds differ only by the 
parameter η. By examining the significance and the magnitude of η  it is possible to 
conclude whether there are two thresholds rather than one and to measure the distance 
between them. Finally, both the optimal R&D and the threshold equations include time-
invariant individual effects, i1α  and i0α , and idiosyncratic error terms, it1ε  and it0ε . 
 
                                                 
19
 Taking logarithms is a necessary step if we are to assume normality given that R&D expenditures 
follow a lognormal distribution. 
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4.1. Identification of the thresholds with a dynamic panel data type-2 tobit model  
Clearly, the thresholds are not observable in practice, which implies that the parameters 
of equation (14) cannot be estimated directly. Fortunately, we can observe a firm’s 
decision to perform R&D, which contains information about the relationship between 
optimal and threshold R&D. Specifically, R&D performance takes place when 
0~* >− Eitit xx  for new R&D performers and when 0~* >− Citit xx  for ongoing R&D 
performers. More formally, this can be expressed in the classical type-2 tobit 
formulation with the following selection and level equations: 
 
]0[1 22201 >++++= − itiitititit wsubyy εαβγη                                        (15) 
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where 012 βββ −= , iii 012 ααα −= , ititit 012 εεε −=  and *itx  is given by equation (13)20. 
Under certain conditions, in a maximum likelihood estimation framework, the 
parameters of the threshold equation (η  and 0β ) can be recovered through the 
relationship between the parameters of the selection and the level equations. As 
discussed in Nelson (1977) an exclusion restriction, in our case the absence on 
theoretical grounds of the subsidy variable in the threshold equation, is a sufficient 
condition for the identification of all parameters of the model.  
 
4.2. The relationship between true state dependence and the thresholds 
The main feature of selection equation (15) is that it includes the lag of the dependent 
variable among the set of regressors. Algebraically, this is a very obvious derivation of 
the fact that the threshold equation includes dynamics. Conceptually, however, the 
mechanism by which the existence of the two thresholds results in a dynamic selection 
equation is very interesting and merits careful consideration.  
 
Dynamic selection equations enable us to identify whether R&D performance exhibits 
persistence, and whether this persistence is attributable to true state dependence as 
                                                 
20
 For variables like fixed costs that appear in (14) but not in (13) the corresponding coefficient of 2β
equals .0β−  
16
  
opposed to spurious state dependence. True state dependence implies that a causal 
behavioural effect exists in the sense that the decision to undertake R&D in one period 
enhances the probability of R&D being undertaken in the subsequent period. In the 
presence of sunk costs two thresholds must exist if true state dependence is prevalent. 
To understand why, note that for any optimal R&D that lies between the entry and the 
continuation threshold, Eitit
C
it xxx
~~ * << , present R&D performance occurs thanks to the 
past performance of R&D. The wider the gap between the two thresholds, i.e. the higher 
the sunk costs, the higher is the chance of having true state dependence.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the thresholds and true state dependence. It 
considers two optimal R&D paths that take different values in the initial period but are 
identical thereafter. The deviation in the initial period is not trivial, though, and leads to 
different R&D decisions: path 1 entails R&D performance at t=0 while path 2 does not. 
This initial departure allows us to evaluate, for periods t=1 to t=4, the relevance of 
previous experience in explaining present R&D performance. This evaluation is 
conducted for three different scenarios that consider varying distances between the 
thresholds reflecting the magnitude of R&D sunk costs. As the continuation threshold 
gradually approaches that of entry and the gap between the thresholds shrinks, the 
importance of past experience in accounting for present R&D performance decreases 
and true state dependence vanishes. For instance, in case 1 where the distance between 
the thresholds is substantial, experience is found to have considerable impact: path 1 
leads to R&D performance from t=1 onwards while path 2 never results in R&D 
performance. The effect of previous experience declines in case 2, where the distance 
between the thresholds is smaller. Here, previous experience only explains R&D 
performance at t=1. Finally, when there is a single threshold, as in case 3, previous 
experience is irrelevant for explaining R&D performance. In the estimation framework 
of equation (15), case 1 should lead to significant and sizeable estimates of η  while 
case 2 should lead to significant but modest estimates and case 3 to values 
insignificantly different from zero.   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
 
4.3. Maximum likelihood estimation 
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The estimation of dynamic panel data sample selection models poses two main 
problems: the treatment of unobserved individual effects and the so-called problem of 
the initial conditions. The modeling of the former through fixed effects leads to the 
“incidental parameters” problem, which results in inconsistent maximum likelihood 
estimators when the number of periods is small (Neyman and Scott, 1948). The latter 
arises because of the fact that, for variables generated by stochastic dynamic processes, 
the first observation (that which initialises the process) is correlated both with future 
realizations of the variable (due to state dependence) and with the unobservable 
individual term (given that the unobservable term is part of the process that generates 
the variable). Consequently, unless the first observation in the process (i.e., the initial 
condition) is accounted for, the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the 
unobservable term and the estimates will be inconsistent21.  
 
We use the method proposed by Raymond et al. (2010) which provides simple, 
satisfactory solutions to both of these problems: in light of the shortcomings of the fixed 
effects approach, they assume the individual effects i1α  and i2α  to follow a joint 
distribution. Moreover, they adopt Wooldridge’s (2005) solution to the initial conditions 
problem, which involves modeling the individual term as a linear function in the 
explanatory variables and the initial conditions 
 
iiii awy 1
2
110
1
1
0
11 +++= αααα  (17) 
iiii awy 2
2
200
1
2
0
22 +++= αααα  (18) 
 
where 01α  and 
0
2α  are constants, iw1  and  iw0
 
are the Mundlak within-means (1978) of 
the explanatory variables and 0iy  is the initial condition, which takes a value of one if 
the firm performs R&D in the first year of the sample used for conducting the estimates 
and 0 otherwise. The vectors )',( 21 itit εε  and )',( 21 ii aa  are assumed to be independently 
and identically (over time and across individuals) normally distributed with means zero 
and covariance matrices: 
 
                                                 
21
 Heckman (1981) provides a good account of the problem of initial conditions. 
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With the above assumptions, the likelihood function of one individual, starting from t=1 
and conditional on the means of the regressors and the initial conditions, is written as 
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where ( )iiititiitit
T
t
aawyyyL 21101
1
,,,,|
−
=
∏  denotes the likelihood function once the individual 
effects have been integrated out and can be treated as fixed, and ( )ii aag 21 ,  stands for 
the bivariate normal density function of )',( 21 ii aa . The double integral in equation (19) 
will be approximated by a “two-step” Gauss-Hermite quadrature (see Raymond et al. 
(2010) for a derivation of the “two-step” Gauss-Hermite quadrature expression). Next, 
treating the individual effects as fixed and using the standard properties of the bivariate 
normal distribution, the partial conditional likelihood function for firm i at period t can 
be written as follows 
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where  
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The presence of γ in both the optimal R&D equation [equation (13)] and the selection 
equation [equation (15)] together with the exclusion of the subsidy coverage from the 
threshold equation [equation (14)], allows us to identify the standard error of it2ε : 
02 δγσ ε = . Knowing 2εσ , it is possible to recover all the parameters of the threshold 
equation via (22). So correct identification of the parameters of the threshold equation 
critically depends on parameters 0δ and γ . We will in turn discuss how to correctly 
identify these two parameters. 
 
4.4. Identification of γ and 0δ .  
Public agencies may be encouraged to support projects with the best technical merits 
and the highest potential for commercial success. As these projects typically have high 
private returns they are likely to be undertaken even in the absence of the support. In 
other words, subsidies are granted by agencies according to the contemporary effort and 
performance of firms, and hence are presumably endogenous. This implies that the 
compound error terms of the levels and the selection equations itia 11 ε+  and itia 22 ε+
 
are likely to be positively correlated with eitρ  leading to upward biased estimates of γ  
and
 
0δ . 
 
To solve this problem we assume that the subsidies to which firms react are expected in 
advance, along the lines of González et al. (2005). However, we construct a slightly 
different measure of expected subsidies drawing on the information we have on subsidy 
applicants. González et al. (2005) calculate the expected subsidy coverage as follows:  
 
)0,|()|0()|( >>== itititititititeit zEzPzE ρρρρρ ρρρ  (25) 
 
where )|0( ρρ itit zP >  is the probability of receiving a subsidy (joint probability of 
applying for a subsidy and receiving the subsidy) and )0,|( >itpitit zE ρρ  is the expected 
value of the subsidy for successful applicants. 
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Unlike in González et al. (2005) our expected subsidy coverage is not positive for all 
firms but just for subsidy applicants. This gives more within variation to the expected 
subsidy shares and enables us to control for fixed effects via the inclusion of Mundlak 
means, which will ultimately result in a better identification of γ  and
 
0δ . We calculate 
the expected subsidy coverage as follows: 
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where itap
 
is a dummy with value one if firm i applies for a subsidy in year t, 
)1,|0( => ititit apzP ρρ  is now the probability of receiving a subsidy among applicants 
and )0,|( >itpitit zE ρρ  is the expected value of the subsidy for successful applicants. 
We estimate )1,|0( => ititit apzP ρρ
 
by means of a probit with parameters 1λ  and 
assume ),(~)0,|ln( 2σλρρ ρρ itititit zNz >  to estimate )0,|( >itpitit zE ρρ  by means of an 
OLS regression with parameters 2λ . We use an augmented version of the specification 
proposed in González et al. (2005) to estimate the parameters 1λ  and 2λ  used to 
construct eitρ
 
(see appendix A). We assume that the expected coverage ratio is 
uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic and the individual-specific error terms in (13) and 
(15).   
 
 
5. Empirical specification and results 
 
5.1. Empirical specification 
Optimal R&D equation – The dependent variable used in the main equation of interest 
is the natural logarithm of R&D expenditure. The explanatory variable of interest is 
)ˆ1ln( eitρ−− . The main control is the Mundlak mean of )ˆ1ln( eitρ−− . The remaining 
explanatory variables are derived from equation (5). Some of these are lagged by one 
period to ensure that they are predetermined. Average variable costs (lagged by one 
period) are used as a proxy for future marginal costs ( τ+itc ). Future demand shifters (
21
  
τ+itz ) are captured by two dummy variables (both lagged by one period) that report 
whether the main market of the firm is in recession or expansion. The elasticity of 
demand with respect to quality (ε ) and of product quality with respect to R&D (φ ) are 
approximated by the advertising/sales ratio (lagged) and the average industry patents. 
Finally, a firm’s market share and a dummy variable representing concentrated markets 
(both lagged by one period) are used as indicators of the elasticity of demand with 
respect to price (σ ).  
 
Selection equation –The dependent variable of the selection equation is a dummy 
indicating whether or not the firm performed R&D at period t. The explanatory 
variables in the selection equation are a combination of the variables in the levels and 
the threshold equations (see equation (15)). Thus, apart from the variables included in 
the optimal R&D equation the selection equation also contains some extra variables 
specific to the threshold equation. These variables are the lagged dependent variable 
)( 1−ity  and a set of variables aimed at capturing fixed costs ( itf ): the presence of 
foreign capital, quality controls and the employment of highly skilled workers. We also 
control for the subsidy applicant dummy )( itap . 
 
It is reasonable to assume that larger firms will make larger R&D investments. For this 
reason, in addition to all the variables listed above, we include a set of employment-size 
dummies and the total sales (in logarithms) of the firm in both equations. Sales are 
assumed to be predetermined given that they are only affected by year τ−t  R&D 
expenditures. Notice that including sales in the right hand side is equivalent to adopting 
a Dorfman and Steiner (1954)-type expression (see González et al., 2005). Starting from 
equation (5) of the underlying theoretical model and assuming 0=τ  we get that R&D 
effort is given by )ln()ln()1ln()/ln( *** σφερ −+−−= eitititit qpx  or, what is the same, that 
optimal R&D expenditures are given by )ln()ln()ln()1ln()ln( *** ititeitit qpx −−+−−= σφερ
. This implies that, given our specification, the parameter (γ ) in the optimal R&D 
equation should be one. For 0>τ  we cannot get to such a compact expression, but if 
we are willing to assume that the departure from the situation in which 0=τ
 
is not too 
sharp, then the parameter should still be close to one (even though not necessarily one).  
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Moreover, we also include year and industry dummies to account for variations in the 
business cycle and any sector-specific characteristics. The explanatory variables (other 
than )ˆ1ln( eitρ−− ) have little within variation and are highly correlated with their 
Mundlak means. After experimenting with different specifications we resolved not to 
include the Mundlak means of the control variables in the regressions22. Descriptive 
statistics and definitions of all the explanatory variables are reported in Tables 5 and 6.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
5.2. Estimation results 
Table 7 shows the estimates obtained with the dynamic panel data type-2 tobit model. In 
the optimal R&D equation the parameter associated with the expected subsidy coverage 
is substantially below unity. This estimate would suggest partial crowding-out. If the 
subsidy coverage increases by 1 percentage point, hence the R&D costs supported by 
the firm decrease by 1 percent, R&D increases by only 0.3 percent. This result is quite 
different from the point estimates of González et al. (2005) and Takalo et al. (2011) who 
get a coefficient close to one. One potential explanation for this low coefficient is that in 
our regressions we consider some firms with subsidies covering almost 100% of their 
R&D expenditures. These large subsidy shares might not fit our modeling of subsidies 
as a share of to-be-incurred R&D expenditures and might well be aimed at financing 
endeavours other than R&D. Indeed, CDTI’s (Spain’s national agency of technology) 
upper bound for the share of covered R&D costs was 60% until 2007 and increased up 
to 75% in 2007. This would explain the lack of sensitivity of R&D with respect to the 
subsidy coverage. When we restrict to firms with subsidies lower than 60% or 75% the 
coefficient comes closer to one (see Table 8) meaning that subsidies are not misused 
(every euro of subsidy is invested in R&D)23.  
                                                 
22
 This implies that the coefficients of the explanatory variables will be the sum of their direct effects and 
their correlations with the individual effects, so that they should be interpreted as plain correlations rather 
than as causal effects. This is not problematic in our setting given that we mainly need the controls to 
establish the height of the thresholds. The results we will present in the next sections are robust to the 
inclusion of the Mundlak means in the regressions. 
23
 The same happens when we use the actual subsidy coverage instead of the expected subsidy coverage. 
The coefficient of the levels equation is insignificant when we use all subsidized firms, and it becomes 
significant and close to one when we restrict the sample to firms with subsidy shares below 60%. Notice 
that it is possible to estimate the optimal R&D equation with the actual subsidy coverage but not the 
selection equation because all subsidized firms carry out R&D. This causes actual subsidies to perfectly 
23
  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 [INSERT TABLE 8]  
 
The expected subsidy coverage parameter is also significant in the selection equation, 
indicating that subsidies not only affect the level of investment in R&D but also the 
decision to perform R&D (the point estimate does not vary when we restrict the sample 
to firms with 60% and 75% subsidy coverages). An illustrative magnitude of subsidies’ 
inducement effects is given by the average marginal increase in firms’ probability of 
performing R&D caused by a discrete change in the expected subsidy coverage from 
zero to a positive magnitude (assuming 01 =−ity  and fixing all other regressors at their 
mean). A discrete change in the expected subsidy coverage from 0 to 30% (0 to 60%) 
leads to an increase in firms’ probability of performing R&D of 17 (55) percentage 
points.  
 
The significance of the lagged dependent variable in the selection equation indicates 
that true state dependence exists. This result is in line with the findings of Peters (2009) 
and Mañez et al. (2009). We can conclude that there is a behavioural effect: firms that 
perform R&D in a given period have a 37% higher probability of performing R&D in 
the next period than firms that did not perform R&D (see the average partial effect 
reported at the bottom of Table 8). A direct consequence of the existence of true state 
dependence is that the R&D threshold also depends on past R&D performance giving 
rise to an entry and a continuation threshold. The distance between the two thresholds 
(in logarithms) is 2.0=η  (see equation (14)), meaning that the continuation threshold 
is 20% lower than the entry threshold24.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
predict R&D performance. So it is not possible to estimate the subsidies inducement effects with the 
actual subsidy coverage alone. 
24
 This distance between the two thresholds should be seen as a lower bound given that the coefficient of 
the expected subsidy coverage in the levels equation is possibly greater than our point estimate 31.0ˆ =γ . If 
we use the point estimate obtained in column (2) of Table 8 ( 64.0ˆ =γ ) the distance between the thresholds 
doubles: 41.060.1*)48.2/64.0( ==η  (recall that the coefficients of the threshold equation are obtained as 
2210 bbb εσ−=   where 1b
 
and 1b  are the coefficients of the optimal R&D and the selection equations 
respectively and 02 / δγσ ε = ).  
 
24
  
The signs of the coefficients of the other explanatory variables are largely in agreement 
with the results reported in González et al. (2005) and the predictions from the 
analytical section. The advertising to sales ratio, as a proxy of the elasticity of demand 
with respect to quality ε, has a positive and significant impact on both R&D expenditure 
and on the decision to perform R&D but is not significant in the threshold. High 
average variable costs (as a proxy for marginal cost c) seem to be an obstacle for R&D 
performance but do not significantly affect the thresholds. The quality controls and 
skilled labour dummies, designed to capture fixed costs (excluded from the optimal 
R&D equation on theoretical grounds) are found to have a positive and significant effect 
on R&D performance and a negative effect on the thresholds (although this negative 
effect is only significant in the case of the skilled labour dummy). Finally, the variables 
aimed at accounting for scale effects, such as the set of size dummies and the sales 
volume, have a positive and significant impact on optimal R&D expenditure. The sales 
volume also positively affects the propensity to perform R&D and the threshold. This is 
a logical result that confirms that larger firms make larger R&D investments reflecting 
their larger capacity or the more pressing requirement to achieve a perceptible impact in 
their already large volume of business.  
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
The estimated subsidy coefficients in the optimal R&D and the selection equations do 
not change much when we estimate the optimal R&D equation without the selection 
equation, controlling or not for individual effects, assuming them to be fixed or random, 
and controlling or not for the other control variables (these results are not reported but 
are available upon request). We also experimented with two alternative measures of the 
expected subsidy coverage. The first one ( 1_ˆ eitρ ) is calculated via expression (2A) in 
appendix A, using the same static specification as in González et al. (2005) but 
predicting the subsidy coverage on the basis of the probability of being successful in the 
subsidy applications for applicants only, assigning a value zero to non-applicants. The 
second one ( 2_ˆ eitρ ) is calculated via expression (3A) in appendix A and is exactly 
equivalent to the one in González et al. (2005), i.e. with the same specification and 
predicted with the probability of getting a subsidy for all firms in the sample.  
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Table 9 (column (1)) shows that our results still hold when we use 1_ˆ eitρ  instead of eitρˆ . 
It also shows that 2_ˆ eitρ
 
(the expected subsidy coverage measured as in González et al. 
(2005)) is not resistant to the inclusion of the Mundlak means. Column (2) reports static 
estimates equivalent to the ones of González et al. (2005). The results are very similar to 
theirs (even though we use different survey years). When we include the lagged R&D 
dummy in column (3) the coefficient of the selection equation is still significant but 
much lower. This suggests that González et al. (2005) attribute to subsidies an effect 
that may be due to persistence. When we include the Mundlak mean in column (4), 
subsidies are not significant anymore because 2_ˆ eitρ
 
does not have enough within 
variation to disentangle its direct effect from the Mundlak means. 
 
 [INSERT TABLE 9] 
 
 
6. Policy implications  
 
6.1. R&D and subsidy coverage thresholds 
First, we would like to characterize the distributions of the entry and continuation R&D 
thresholds. They are calculated from the estimated parameters of equation (14) 
according to the following expressions:  
 
)ˆ)21(ˆexp(~ 2000 εσβ += itEit wx  (25) 
)ˆ)21(ˆˆexp(~ 2000 εσβη ++−= itCit wx  (26) 
 
Similarly, the subsidy thresholds are calculated using the estimated parameters of 
equations (13) and (14) as the subsidies that make the firms indifferent between 
performing R&D or not, i.e., equalizing optimal and threshold R&D (equations (13) and 
(14)), giving the following expressions25: 
 
                                                 
25
 Recall that threshold R&D is the level of R&D expenditure that makes the firm indifferent to 
performing R&D or not. 
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Kernel densities of the R&D and subsidy thresholds are provided in Figure 4, which is 
complemented by Table 10. 26 As expected, continuation thresholds take on average 
lower values than those adopted by entry thresholds. For instance, while only 42% of 
the entry R&D thresholds are below 50,000€, as much as 47% of the continuation R&D 
thresholds are below 50,000€. Focusing on the largest values, 27% of the entry 
thresholds are above 200,000€ while 23% of continuation thresholds reach this value. 
Regarding subsidy coverage, around 44% of the entry thresholds concentrate in values 
higher than 60% which implies that most firms need to have their R&D expenditure 
almost entirely subsidised in order for them to engage in R&D. It is equally true that 
18% of the entry thresholds take negative values meaning that there is a mass of firms 
which does not require subsidies to engage in R&D. Not surprisingly, the percentage of 
firms with negative continuation thresholds is much larger, with a value close to 38%. 
This implies that almost half of the firms in the sample are self-sufficient to continue 
performing R&D in the absence of public support.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4] 
[INSERT TABLE 10] 
 
6.2. Permanent inducement effects 
The second question we set out to address is whether subsidies can achieve permanent 
inducement effects. By knowing the entry and continuation subsidy thresholds, it is 
possible to classify firms in three different scenarios according to their dependence on 
subsidies. The first scenario considers firms that have positive entry and exit thresholds 
( 0~&0~ >> CE ρρ ). These firms should be permanently subsidised to ensure the 
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 Figure 4 only shows the range (0, 600000) for threshold R&D which is where most of the observations 
concentrate (90% and 93% of entry and continuation R&D thresholds lie in this interval). Similarly, it 
only shows the range (-1, 1) for threshold subsidies (99% and 84% of the entry and the continuation 
subsidy coverage thresholds lie in this interval). Note, however, that the kernel densities have been 
calculated using all the observations in the sample.  
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profitability of their R&D activities. The second scenario ( 0~&0~ ≤≤ CE ρρ ) considers 
firms that have negative entry and exit thresholds and, hence, find R&D profitable even 
in the absence of subsidies. The third scenario ( 0~&0~ ≤> CE ρρ ), considers firms with 
positive entry thresholds but negative continuation thresholds. The last scenario opens 
up the possibility of using subsidies to induce permanent entry into R&D through 
temporary increases in a firm’s expected subsidies.  
 
Column 1A in Table 11 shows that 20% of the observations in the sample require 
subsidies to start performing R&D but can continue performing R&D without them; 
18% can perform R&D regardless of the subsidies; and the remaining 62% always 
require a subsidy to persist in R&D activities. Interestingly (see column 1B), 60% of the 
observations that only need entry subsidies are actually already performing R&D, while 
the other 40% has still to be induced into engaging in R&D activities. Further, almost 
all the firms (93%) that do not depend on subsidies are R&D performers and virtually 
none (just 5%) of the firms that always need subsidies perform R&D.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 11] 
 
In column (2) we refer to firms instead of observations and find that some of the firms 
that need only a trigger subsidy to become stable R&D performers change from one 
scenario to another over the sample years. For instance, 11% of the firms need entry 
subsidies in certain periods but can enter into R&D without such a requirement in 
others. Another similarly sized group (8%) alternates between periods of dependence on 
entry subsidies and periods of dependence on both entry and continuation subsidies. 
 
In column (3) we report the values for the whole population of Spanish manufacturing 
firms27. The figures show that 25% (9+9+7) of Spanish manufacturing firms need 
subsidies to enter into R&D but not to continue. Only 5% of the firms can perform 
R&D without subsidies (almost all of which actually perform R&D). This value is 
notably lower than that obtained in column (2), reflecting the fact that this group is 
                                                 
27
 We are able to undertake this exercise because the ESEE has a known representativeness. The number 
of small (between 10 and 200 employees) and large (more than 200 employees) firms included in the 
sample amounts to 5% and 50% of the whole population respectively. Hence, all we need to do in order to 
build representative proportions is to multiply, where appropriate, the number of small and large firms by 
20 and 2 respectively. 
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comprised mainly of large firms, which are in fact over-represented in the ESEE 
sample. The opposite is true for the proportion of firms that need subsidies to both start 
and continue performing R&D which amounts to 70% of the population.  
 
On the basis of these results, we can conclude that there is a case for using subsidies to 
induce firms to go permanently into R&D by means of one-shot trigger subsidies. 
Around 10.7% (9%*(1-0.56) + 9%*(1-0.72) + 7%*(1-0.4)) of Spanish manufacturing 
firms can be permanently brought into R&D by means of trigger subsidies (this number 
lowers to 6.5% (9%*(1-0.56) + 9%*(1-0.72)) if we disregard firms in row 5 which 
require continuation subsidies in some periods). 
 
Table 12 provides information on the distribution of entry subsidies of those firms that 
can be permanently induced. Remarkably, the subsidy coverage required to induce 
permanent entry is quite large for most of these firms: 29% and 18% of all “induceable” 
firms need subsidies above 40% and 50% of their R&D expenditures respectively to 
engage in R&D.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 12] 
 
Table 13 provides a breakdown by industries. The percentage of R&D firms varies 
widely across industries ranging from 4% in printing products to 54% is office and data 
processing machinery (see column 1). Most firms in low-tech industries need both entry 
and continuation subsidies but the percentage decreases for medium-tech and high-tech 
industries (see column 3). The percentage of firms with positive entry thresholds and 
negative continuation thresholds is remarkable in all industries and particularly in the 
medium-tech and high-tech ones (see column 4). This implies that there is room for 
increasing the percentage of R&D firms in all industries. Column (2) shows the 
maximum percentage of R&D firms that can be attained in every single industry by 
adding up the numbers of columns (4) and (5).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 13] 
 
6.3. Evaluation of R&D inducing subsidy policies  
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The third question we set out to address concerns the effectiveness of a policy aimed at 
inducing all the firms with positive entry thresholds and negative continuation 
thresholds to undertake R&D. To carry out this evaluation we assume that subsidies are 
granted at t=0 and then set equal to zero from t=1 onwards. Thus, all we need to do is to 
contrast the inducement costs, namely the total amount of subsidies granted at t=0, with 
the stream of R&D investments that are subsequently manifested.  
 
In order to infer these inducement costs, it is convenient to express the subsidy 
thresholds in absolute terms rather than as a proportion of a firm’s R&D expenditure. 
This can be easily achieved by multiplying the subsidy coverage threshold by the R&D 
threshold: EEE xsubsidy ~~ρ=  and CCC xsubsidy ~~ρ= . Then, the cost of inducing all the 
firms that only need entry subsidies is obtained by adding up the entry subsidies 
)( Esubsidy  of all firms with 0~0~ ≤> CE and ρρ  that are not performing R&D yet28. 
We find that inducing all these firms (about 3,000 firms) would cost around €110 
million. To obtain an idea as to whether these numbers make sense it might be helpful 
to know that in 2009 the CDTI (Spain’s national agency of technology) spent €584 
million on direct subsidies to finance 944 projects. In comparison with this benchmark 
€110 million seems a very low number.  
 
There are several potential explanations for why we get such a small number. First, we 
are focusing on manufacturing firms while most subsidies from CDTI go to service 
sectors. Second, the average subsidy granted by CDTI in 2009 was notably larger than 
the average subsidy in our sample (€620,000 vs. €135,000). Third, firms identified as 
“induceable” have lower *xˆ
 
(€138,000 vs. €349,000) and Ex~ˆ
 
(€165,000 vs. €256,000) 
than subsidized firms. This implies that subsidies aimed at inducing permanent R&D 
performance have to subsidize lower quantities than subsidies awarded to active R&D 
firms. In any case, we must admit that our estimate seems a lower bound of the true 
inducement costs.  
 
The yearly R&D investments that would be triggered by this inducing policy from t=1 
onward are estimated at €453 million. This implies that, considering an optimistic 
                                                 
28
 The observations are weighted following the steps mentioned above in order to obtain representative 
results for the whole population of Spanish manufacturing firms. 
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scenario, in which no induced firm would abandon R&D activities after t=1, the R&D 
stock generated would scale up to €2,500 million in 15 years and reach a steady level of 
almost €3,000 million in 35 years. Under a more pessimistic scenario, in which half of 
the induced firms would abandon R&D after t=1, the R&D stock generated would reach 
a steady level of €1,500 million in 20 years. This implies that the inducing policy would 
still be effective even if the inducement costs were tenfold the estimated ones and half 
of the induced firms failed to persist into R&D.  
 
To sum up, “extensive” subsidies can be used to expand the share of R&D firms in the 
Spanish manufacture from 20% to 30% which would in turn lead to an increase of R&D 
intensity (understood as total R&D expenditures over total sales) from 0.64% to 0.74%. 
So going back to Figure 1, “extensive” subsidies have the potential for placing Spain 
somewhere between Italy and Ireland, but not further. 29 For Spain to reach the group of 
countries formed by France, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium, more structural 
policies consisting in lowering the entry and continuation subsidy thresholds should be 
implemented. Recall from expression (8) that the thresholds can be lowered by 
improving demand conditions, lowering the marginal and the fixed costs and shortening 
the lag between R&D and profits. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Researchers and policymakers alike have paid little attention to subsidies as a tool for 
expanding the base of R&D performers. But it is likely that there are sunk entry costs 
associated to R&D that can be smoothed out by subsidies and hence justify the 
existence of “extensive” subsides. In this paper we have sought to contribute fresh 
evidence regarding the feasibility and efficiency of such subsidies. 
 
We have framed our analysis around a dynamic model with sunk entry costs in which 
firms decide whether to start, continue or stop performing R&D on the grounds of the 
subsidy coverage they expect to receive. The main appeal of this framework is that a 
firm’s optimal participation strategy can be characterised in terms of two subsidy 
                                                 
29
 Notice that this only a rough comparison as our analysis takes into account both intramural and 
extramural R&D while Figure 1 considers only intramural R&D. 
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thresholds characterising R&D entry and continuation. The existence of two thresholds 
proves crucial as it allows us to detect which firms need subsidies to start but not to 
continue performing R&D. Recognizing the risky nature of R&D (which we have not 
done in this paper) would only reinforce the argument of the existence of entry-
deterring sunk costs. 
 
We are able to compute the subsidy thresholds from the estimates of a dynamic panel 
data type-2 tobit model with an R&D investment equation and an R&D participation 
equation. By including dynamics in the selection equation, we are able to estimate true 
state dependence, which is ultimately used to measure the distance between the two 
thresholds. The model is estimated for an unbalanced panel of about 2,000 Spanish 
manufacturing firms observed over a 12-year period.   
 
We find that expected subsidies significantly affect both R&D expenditure and the 
decision to perform R&D. In addition, we conclude that R&D performance is true state 
dependent which leads to the existence of two subsidy thresholds, one that determines 
entry into R&D and one that assures continuation of R&D. 
 
Using the estimated expected subsidy coverage thresholds we find that 25% of Spanish 
manufacturing firms need subsidies to start but not to continue doing R&D. Slightly 
more than half of the firms belonging to this group are already R&D performers, which 
means that the other half (10% of Spanish manufacturing firms) is still to be induced. 
Should they be induced, the proportion of R&D firms in the Spanish manufacture would 
increase by about one half (from 20% to 30%). We estimate that inducing this group of 
firms into R&D would cost €110 million, while the stream of R&D investments that this 
would give rise to would generate an R&D stock of €2,500 million over a 15-year 
period. This result emphasises the importance of dynamic additionality, generally 
disregarded in analyses of subsidy effectiveness. 
 
The findings offered by this paper call for a revision of the classical subsidy granting 
schemes. Subsidies have traditionally been awarded to consolidated R&D performers. 
However, agencies have shown a certain reluctance to award subsidies to reduce the 
entry costs for R&D beginners. This is mainly because they do not really know whether 
there is scope for using subsidies to induce entry into R&D, and they are unaware of the 
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costs involved. This paper has confirmed that subsidies can be used to defray the sunk 
costs and encourage entry into R&D. Besides, the costs of inducing all these firms have 
been found to be relatively moderate compared with the R&D stock that would be 
generated.  
 
Of course, subsidies aimed at inducing entry may well generate moral hazard problems 
when actually implemented. For instance, firms might be tempted to perform R&D 
during a period simply to receive the subsidy and, once the subsidy received, they cease 
their R&D activities. Similarly, they might over-invest in R&D so as to obtain larger 
subsidies. A solution might be to tie the provision of such funds to a commitment from 
the firms to invest similar amounts in R&D during the subsequent years. Only firms that 
intend to continue their R&D activities are likely to accept such a contract. 
Unquestionably, the optimal design of subsidies aimed at inducing sustained R&D 
merits careful consideration and constitutes a topic for future research. 
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Appendix A. Calculation of the expected subsidy coverage 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3A report estimates of the parameter vectors 1λ
 
and 2λ  
using an augmented version of the specification proposed in González et al. (2005). The 
dependent variable of the probit regression is a dummy with value one for successful 
subsidy applicants and value zero for rejected applicants (successful applicant dummy). 
The dependent variable of the OLS regression is the natural logarithm of the subsidy 
coverage for successful applicants.  
 
Regarding the explanatory variables, the lagged endogenous variables are included to 
capture persistence in the probability of getting subsidies and in the subsidy coverage. 
There are some cases in which firms that received a subsidy at time t did not receive a 
subsidy at t-1. For this reason we complement the log of the subsidy in the OLS 
equation with a dummy variable taking value of one if the firm did not receive a subsidy 
at t-1.  
 
We include as explanatory variables those considered in González et al. (2005) that 
public agencies may consider as critical when making their decisions: firm size, age, 
degree of technological sophistication, a dummy indicating whether the firm is a 
domestic exporter, a dummy denoting whether the firm has foreign capital and a 
dummy indicating whether the firm has market power. Finally, time, region and 
industry dummies are also included. We also include some explanatory variables not 
considered in González et al. (2005): a lagged R&D dummy to reflect the fact that 
regular R&D firms are more likely to get subsidies while R&D entrants are likely to be 
awarded larger subsidy shares, and the initial value of the lagged dependent variables, 
the R&D dummy and the “no subsidy dummy” to capture firms’ unobservable 
heterogeneity. Some of these explanatory variables are considered as predetermined and 
are thus included with a lag, while others are assumed to be strictly exogenous.  
 
The definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions are 
reported in tables 1A and 2A respectively. The results are reported in Table 3A. The 
probability of receiving a subsidy (column 1) is higher for applicants who received 
subsidies in the past, have experience in R&D, and are large and technologically 
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sophisticated. Subsidy coverage (column 2) depends on the past coverage, and agencies 
appear to be more inclined to award large subsidies to R&D entrants, to small firms and 
to firms with market power. All the parameters of the initial conditions are significant.  
 
Using the estimated 1ˆλ
 
and 2ˆλ
 
we calculate the expected subsidy coverage eitρˆ  as 
follows: 
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The estimated expected subsidies have reasonable values. The average probability of 
receiving a subsidy among applicants is 68%, the average expected subsidy coverage 
conditional on its being granted is 31%, and the average expected subsidy is 2%. Only a 
small proportion of the expected conditional subsidy coverages take values higher than 
100%. There are five observations for which the predicted unconditional expected 
subsidy coverage takes a value higher than 100%. For these five observations we 
replaced the predicted value by 99% to calculate )ˆ1ln( eitρ−− . 
 
In columns (3) and (5) we estimate parameter vectors 3λ
 
and 5λ  omitting the lagged 
R&D dummy and the initial conditions (that is, using the specification proposed in 
González et al., 2005). We calculate 1_ˆ eitρ  as follows: 
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In column (4) we obtain the parameter vector 4λ
 
by estimating the probit for the whole 
sample (not just for subsidy applicants) and again using the same specification proposed 
in González et al. (2005). We calculate 2_ˆ eitρ  as in González et al. (2005): 
 
)ˆ)2/1(ˆexp()ˆ(2_ˆ 254 σλλρ ρρ +Φ= ititeit zz   (3A) 
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Descriptive statistics of the different expected subsidy coverage measures are provided 
in Table 4A.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1A] 
[INSERT TABLE 2A] 
[INSERT TABLE 3A] 
[INSERT TABLE 4A] 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Source: Community Innovation Survey, 2008. Eurostat. 
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Figure 2 
 Representation of the indifference condition that defines the thresholds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: provided that the following condition is satisfied 
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period t  optimal entry-exit strategy can be depicted as in Figure 2. This figure shows 
that the thresholds define three regions into which subsidies can be differentiated. 
Region 1 contains all those subsidies for which a firm will not perform R&D regardless 
of its history. At the opposite end of the spectrum, region 3 contains all those subsidies 
for which the firm will perform R&D regardless of its history. Finally, region 2 
identifies all those values of a subsidy for which a firm’s previous status does matter. 
More specifically, a firm expecting to receive a subsidy that falls between the 
boundaries defined by region 2 will only perform R&D if it was already performing 
R&D in the previous period.  
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Figure 3. Relationship between the thresholds and true state dependence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the circles         identify the periods in which, under path 1, firms perform R&D 
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Figure 4. Kernel densities of R&D and subsidy coverage thresholds 
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1. Composition of the panel 
t number of firms 
2 366 
3 444 
4 430 
5 135 
6 195 
7 80 
8 104 
9 168 
10 138 
11 80 
12 142 
13 339 
Number of firms 2,621 
Notes: this table shows the number 
of firms that are observed for each 
spell length. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Successful applicants, rejected applicants and non applicants 
Number of 
firms % 
Successful applicants 
  
Continue in R&D 1,013 94 
Enter into R&D 69 6 
Fail to enter into R&D 0 0 
Exit from R&D 0 0 
Total 1,082 100 
   
Rejected applicants 
  
Continue in R&D 319 63 
Enter into R&D 44 9 
Fail to enter into R&D 119 24 
Exit from R&D 21 4 
Total 503 100 
   
Non applicants 
  
Continue in R&D 2,708 21 
Enter into R&D 371 3 
Fail to/do not want to enter into R&D 9,103 72 
Exit from R&D 516 4 
Total 12,698 100 
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Table 3. Percentage of R&D and subsidized firms by firm size 
Fewer than 200 workers More than 200 workers 
Firms with 
R&D 
(%) 
Subsidized 
R&D 
firms  
(%) 
Average 
subsidy 
share 
(%) 
 
Firms with 
R&D 
(%) 
Subsidized 
R&D 
firms  
(%) 
Average 
subsidy 
share 
(%) 
1998 19 16 26 
 
73 25 19 
1999 21 14 31 
 
77 27 19 
2000 21 18 34 
 
74 29 25 
2001 18 11 29 
 
71 29 27 
2002 19 14 34 
 
72 27 23 
2003 18 10 34 
 
69 27 23 
2004 18 13 37 
 
70 27 24 
2005 19 16 33 
 
70 31 22 
2006 19 16 33 
 
70 33 27 
2007 19 20 35 
 
65 33 28 
2008 19 23 37 
 
65 34 35 
2009 20 25 34 
 
65 39 29 
Notes: this table reports the percentage of R&D performers, the percentage of 
subsidized firms among R&D performers and average subsidies for subsidized firms 
in each year of the sample in a breakdown by size. 
 
 
 
Table 4. R&D and subsidies by firm size and frequency of R&D performance 
 
Among all firms,  
% of  
Firms granted subsidies  
at least one year,  
in %, among all 
 
Stable 
R&D  
performers 
Occasional 
R&D 
performers 
 
Stable 
R&D 
performers 
Occasional 
R&D 
performers 
<20 workers 3 11   31 21 
21-50 9 18  32 19 
51-100 24 26  40 23 
101-200 34 23  39 31 
201-500 51 27  53 26 
>500 66 19   56 41 
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Table 5: Variable definitions 
 
Dependent variables 
R&D expenditures: cost of intramural R&D activities and R&D contracted with external laboratories. 
R&D dummy: dummy that takes the value one if R&D expenditure is positive.  
Explanatory variables of interest 
Expected subsidy coverage ( ): computed by equation (26). Product of the predicted probability of 
receiving a subsidy (estimated from subsidy applicants) and the expected value of the subsidy (estimated 
from successful subsidy applicants) for subsidy applicants, zero for non applicants. Two alternative 
measures 
 _1 and  _2 are experimented with (see appendix A for their construction). 
Controls 
Advertising/sales ratio: advertising expenditure over sales. 
Average industry patents: yearly average number of patents registered by the firms in the same industry 
(excluding the patents registered by the firm), for a breakdown of manufacturing in 20 industries.  
Average variable costs: total variable costs divided by nominal output (sales) so they really measure costs 
per unit revenue. Total variable costs are constructed as the sum of labour costs, intermediate input costs 
and subcontracted production costs.  
Concentrated market: dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm reports that its main market 
consists of fewer than 10 competitors.  
Expansive market: dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm reports that its main market is in 
expansion.  
Foreign capital dummy: dummy that takes the value one if the firm has foreign capital. 
Industry dummies: set of 20 industry dummies (NACE-09 classification). The first dummy (industry 
group 1: “meat industry”) is used as the base category and is therefore excluded from the regressions.  
Initial condition: dummy that takes value one if the firm performs R&D in the first year of the sample 
used for conducting the estimates and zero otherwise.   
Market share: market share reported by the firms in its main market.  
Quality controls: dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm carries out quality controls on a 
regular basis.   
Recessive market: dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm reports that its main market is in 
recession.  
Sales: total sales made by the firm. 
Skilled labour: dummy that takes the value one if the firm possesses highly qualified workers (engineers 
and graduates).  
Size dummies: set of six dummy variables, measuring size in terms of number of employees. 
Subsidy applicant dummy (apit): dummy that takes the value one if the firm has applied for a subsidy (i.e., 
has received a subsidy or claims that has searched external funding without success).  
Time dummies: set of 12 yearly dummy variables.  
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics 
standard deviation 
mean overall between within min max 
Dependent variables 
      
 
Ln(R&D expenditures) 12.18 1.85 1.88 0.74 4.04 15.89 
 
R&D dummy t 0.32 0.47 0.43 0.21 0 1 
Explanatory variables 
     
 
 
R&D dummy t-1 0.32 0.47 0.43 0.22 0 1 
 
R&D dummy 0 0.33 0.47 0.47 0 0 1 
 
ln	 1  
  0.03 0.16 0.20 0.10 0 4.61 
 
ln	 1  
 _1 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.10 0 6.21 
 
ln	 1  
 _2 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.06 0 1.93 
 
	ln	 1  
  0.03 0.13 0.20 0.00 0 4.61 
 
	ln	 1  
 _1 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.00 0 3.21 
 
	ln	 1  
 _2 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.00 0 1.10 
 
Subsidy applicant dummy 0.11 0.31 0.28 0.19 0 1 
 
Market share t-1 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.08 0 1 
 
Concentrated market dummy t-1 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.29 0 1 
 
Advertising sales ratio t-1 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0.72 
 
Average industry patents 0.24 0.66 0.32 0.57 0 12.56 
 
Ln(Average variable costs t-1) -0.09 0.14 0.11 0.10 -0.96 0.94 
 
Recessive market t-1 0.19 0.40 0.30 0.31 0 1 
 
Expansive market t-1 0.27 0.44 0.33 0.34 0 1 
 
Foreign capital dummy 0.18 0.38 0.37 0.12 0 1 
 
Quality controls 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.28 0 1 
 
Skilled labour 0.64 0.48 0.45 0.19 0 1 
 
21-50 workers 0.27 0.44 0.39 0.21 0 1 
 
51-100 workers 0.10 0.31 0.26 0.17 0 1 
 
101-200 workers 0.10 0.30 0.28 0.16 0 1 
 
201-500 workers 0.17 0.37 0.35 0.15 0 1 
 
>500 workers 0.08 0.26 0.26 0.09 0 1 
 
Ln(Sales) 15.64 1.92 1.94 0.28 9.55 22.36 
Notes: m( ) denotes the Mundlak mean of the variable in parentheses.  
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Table 7. Results of the dynamic panel data type-2 tobit 
 
(ln of)  
Optimal R&D 
expenditure  
 R&D decision  (ln of)  R&D threshold 
 
 
a
 s.d.b  a s.d.b  a s.d.b 
R&D dummy t-1    1.60 (0.05)*** 	 -0.20 (0.09)** 
Dummy R&D 0 0.49 (0.07)***  1.71 (0.11)***  0.27 (0.11)** 
ln	 1  
                         	   0.31 (0.10)*** 	 2.48 (0.70)***    
	ln	 1  
  0.26 (0.15)*  0.04 (0.33)  0.25 (0.16) 
Applicant dummy    1.20 (0.14)***  -0.15 (0.08)** 
Market share t-1 0.15 (0.11)  -0.04 (0.15)  0.16 (0.11) 
Concentrated market dummy t-1 -0.03 (0.04)  0.05 (0.05)  -0.04 (0.04) 
Advertising sales ratio t-1 2.37 (0.72)***  -0.23 (0.77)  2.40 (0.73)*** 
Average industry patents -0.01 (0.03)  0.06 (0.04)  -0.02 (0.03) 
ln(Average variable costs t-1) -0.11 (0.14)  -0.51 (0.17)***  -0.05 (0.15) 
Recessive market t-1 0.01 (0.05)  0.02 (0.06)  0.01 (0.05) 
Extensive market t-1 -0.02 (0.04)  0.04 (0.05)  -0.03 (0.04) 
Dummy foreign capital    0.03 (0.06)  0.00 (0.01) 
Quality controls    0.10 (0.05)**  -0.01 (0.01) 
Skilled labour    0.23 (0.07)***  -0.03 (0.02)* 
21-50 workers 0.26 (0.09)***  0.14 (0.08)  -0.02 (0.01) 
51-100 workers 0.58 (0.12)***  0.09 (0.11)  -0.01 (0.02) 
101-200 workers 0.81 (0.12)***  0.00 (0.13)  0.00 (0.02) 
201-500 workers 0.97 (0.14)***  0.21 (0.15)  -0.03 (0.02) 
>500 workers 1.19 (0.17)***  -0.08 (0.20)  0.01 (0.03) 
ln(Sales)  0.43 (0.03)***  0.21 (0.04)***  0.40 (0.03)*** 
Constant 2.91 (0.52)***  -6.20 (0.54)***  3.69 (0.61)*** 
         
Industry and time dummies Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
 0.19 (0.04) ***       
   -0.30 (0.04) ***       
 0.72 (0.05) ***       
    0.11 (0.05) **    
       0.77 (0.11) *** 
  1.00 (0.01) ***       
  !  ⁄     0.13 (0.05) **    
      0.97 (0.01) *** 
      
AME R&D dummy t-1   0.37   
      
Log likelihood   -9,482.94   
Number of observations 4,524  14,283  14,283 
Number of firms 1,104  2,621  2,621 
a) b1, b2 and b0 refer to the parameters of equations (13), (15) and (14) respectively. The coefficients 
of the threshold equation have been calculated as  !     ∗  
b) Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The standard errors of the threshold equation have been 
calculated according to the delta method. ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. Gaps indicate exclusion restrictions.  
c) The AME of the R&D dummy at t-1 measures the average probability of doing R&D at t when yit-1 
is fixed at 1 minus the average probability of doing R&D at t when yit-1 is fixed at 0, and it is evaluated 
at the average values of the covariates (see Stewart 2007). 
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Table 8. Robustness check 1: results of the dynamic panel data type-2 tobit 
using observations with  $ 0.60 and  $ 0.75  
 All firms  $ 0.60  $ 0.75 
 (1) (2) (3) 
       
 Optimal R&D equation 
       
Dummy R&D 0 0.49 (0.07)*** 0.39 (0.06) *** 0.40 (0.06) *** 
ln	 1  
   0.31 (0.10)*** 0.64 (0.13) *** 0.58 (0.12) *** 
	ln	 1  
  0.26 (0.15)* 0.12 (0.17) 0.18 (0.16) 
Constant 2.91 (0.52)*** 2.19 (0.48) *** 2.21 (0.49) *** 
       
Other variables Yes Yes Yes 
   
  
# of observations 4,524 4,379 4,446 
# of firms 1,104 1,092 1,098 
       
 Selection equation 
       
Dummy R&D t-1 1.60 (0.05)*** 1.61 (0.05) *** 1.61 (0.05) *** 
Dummy R&D 0 1.71 (0.11)*** 1.69 (0.11) *** 1.67 (0.11) *** 
ln	 1  
   2.48 (0.70)*** 2.26 (0.72) ** 2.38 (0.71) *** 
	ln	 1  
  0.04 (0.33) 0.05 (0.34)  0.03 (0.34)  
Constant -6.20 (0.54)*** -6.17 (0.54) *** -6.19 (0.54) *** 
       
Other variables Yes Yes Yes 
       
# of observations 14,283 14,138 14,205 
# of firms 2,621 2,614 2,618 
     
Log likelihood -9,482.94 -9,266.18 -9,369.21 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of R&D 
expenditures and a dummy with value one if the firm performs R&D. Besides 
the shown coefficients the regressions also include all the controls included in 
Table 7. Column (1) reproduces the results shown in Table 7. 
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Table 9. Robustness check 2: results of the dynamic panel data type-2 tobit using  _1 and   _2 
 )*+ ! 
 _1  )*+ ! 
 _2 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
          
 Optimal R&D equation 
          
Dummy R&D 0 0.38 (0.06) ***    0.58 (0.07) *** 0.46 (0.07) *** 
ln	 1  )*+  0.30 (0.09) ***  0.86 (0.14) *** 0.82 (0.13) *** 0.17 (0.16) 
	ln	 1  )*+ 0.67 (0.13) ***      2.05 (0.26) *** 
Constant 2.15 (0.46) ***  2.61 (0.48) *** 2.59 (0.47) *** 1.87 (0.48) *** 
          
Other variables Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
   
# of observations 4,524  4,524 4,524 4,524 
# of firms 1,104  1,104 1,104 1,104 
          
 Selection equation 
          
Dummy R&D t-1 1.59 (0.05) ***    1.60 (0.05) *** 1.60 (0.05) *** 
Dummy R&D 0 1.66 (0.11) ***    1.87 (0.12) *** 1.77 (0.12) *** 
ln	 1  )*+  1.99 (0.80) **  3.61 (0.31) *** 0.95 (0.27) *** -0.11 (0.30) 
	ln	 1  )*+ 0.59 (0.43)       4.33 (0.55) *** 
Constant -6.17 (0.54) ***  -8.05 (0.40) *** -6.04 (0.52) *** -5.74 (0.52) *** 
          
Other variables Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
          
# of observations 14,283  14,283 14,283 14,283 
# of firms 2,621  2,621 2,621 2,621 
      
Log likelihood -9,473.38  -11,179.48 -9,720.53 -9,666.40 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The dependent 
variables are the natural logarithm of R&D expenditures and a dummy with value one if the firm 
performs R&D. Besides the shown coefficients the regressions also include all the controls 
included in Table 7.  
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Table 10. Distribution of R&D and subsidy coverage thresholds 
R&D thresholds 
 
Subsidy thresholds 
Ex~  Cx~  
Eρ~  Cρ~  
% Cum. % Cum. % Cum. % Cum. 
< 50,000 42 42 47 47 < 0 18 18 38 38 
50,000-100,000 15 57 14 61 0 - 0.2 10 28 13 51 
100,000-150,000 7 64 7 68 0.2 - 0.4 6 34 33 84 
150,000-200,000 6 70 5 73 0.4 - 0.6 22 56 15 100 
200,000-250,000 4 73 4 77 0.6 - 0.8 44 100 0 100 
>200,000 27 100 23 100 0.8 - 1 0 100 0 100 
 
 
 
Table 11. Classification of firms according to their dependence on subsidies 
Groups of firms according to their dependence on 
subsidies 
(1) 
Observations in 
the sample 
(2) 
Firms in the 
sample 
(3) 
Firms in the 
population  
A B A B A B 
1 0~&0~ >> CE ρρ  62 5 58 3 70 4 
2 0~&0~ ≤≤ CE ρρ  18 93 13 95 5 98 
3 0~&0~ ≤> CE ρρ  20 60 10 51 9 56 
4 0~&0~ ≤> CE ρρ , 0~&0~ ≤≤ CE ρρ    11 73 9 72 
5 0~&0~ ≤> CE ρρ , 0~&0~ >> CE ρρ    8 41 7 40 
A) Proportion of observations or firms that fall into each group out of the total. 
B) Proportion of firms in each group that perform R&D (the proportion is calculated with respect to the total 
number of observations in each group, not with respect to the total number of firms in the sample) 
 
 
 
Table 12. Percentage of firms that can be permanently induced 
with each range of subsidy coverage (out of the firms that can be 
permanently induced and are not performing R&D yet) 
Entry subsidy coverage (in %) 
 
% of firms 
10 
 
8 
20 
 
26 
30 
 
19 
40 
 
29 
50 
 
18 
Note: these numbers are an extrapolation for the whole 
manufacture  
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Table 13. R&D and subsidies’ permanent inducement effects by industries 
 
  
% of firms with 
Current % 
of R&D 
firms 
Maximum 
% of R&D 
firms 
(4) + (5) 
,- . 0 
& 
,0 . 0 
,- . 0 
& 
,0 $ 0 
,- $ 0 
& 
,0 $ 0 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Low technological regime industries 
  
 
Meats, meat preparation 10 14 86 12 2 
 
Beverages 29 49 51 37 12 
 
Textiles and clothing 17 20 80 14 6 
 
Leather, leather and skin goods 20 21 79 17 4 
 
Timber, wooden products 8 10 90 8 2 
 
Printing products 4 4 96 3 1 
 
Paper 12 17 83 14 3 
 
Non-metallic mineral products 13 18 82 15 3 
 
Metal products 16 21 79 17 4 
 
Furniture 16 20 80 17 3 
 
Other manufacturing products 7 10 90 10 0 
Medium technological regime industries 
   
  
 
Food products and tobacco 13 14 86 10 4 
 
Rubber and plastic products 22 26 74 18 8 
 
Ferrous and non-ferrous metals 33 52 48 35 17 
 
Agricultural and industrial machinery 40 48 52 33 15 
 
Motor vehicles 32 39 61 29 10 
High technological regime industries 
   
  
 
Chemical products 52 59 41 19 40 
 
Office and data processing machinery 54 65 35 38 27 
 
Electrical goods 39 43 57 25 18 
 
Other transport equipment 40 44 56 29 15 
Notes: these numbers are an extrapolation for the whole manufacture.  
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TABLES APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1A: Variable definition 
 
Dependent variables 
Subsidy coverage: ratio of total public subsidies to total R&D expenditure. Total R&D expenditure of the 
firm includes the cost of intramural R&D activities and payments for outside R&D contracts (this 
definition of R&D is consistent with the definition given in the Frascati Manual). 
Subsidy dummy: dummy that takes the value one for successful subsidy applicants and zero for the 
remaining firms (rejected applicants and non-applicants). 
Successful applicant dummy: dummy that takes the value one for successful subsidy applicants and zero 
for rejected subsidy applicants. 
Explanatory variables 
Age: firms’ age. 
Domestic exporter dummy: dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is domestic (less than 50% 
of foreign capital) and has exported during the year.  
Foreign capital dummy: dummy that takes the value one if the firm has foreign capital. 
Industry dummies: set of 20 industry dummies (NACE-09 classification). The first dummy (industry 
group 1: “meat industry”) is used as the base category and is therefore excluded from the regressions.  
Market power dummy: dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm claims to have market power.  
No subsidy dummy: dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm does not receive subsidies. 
R&D dummy: dummy that takes the value one if R&D expenditure is positive.  
Region dummies: set of 17 autonomous community (region) dummies. 
Size: number of employees in the firm. 
Technological sophistication: dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm uses automatic 
machines, or robot or CAD/CAM, or some combination of these procedures, multiplied by the ratio of 
engineers and university graduates to total personnel.   
Time dummies: set of 12 yearly dummy variables.  
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Table 2A. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the subsidy regressions 
standard deviation 
mean overall between within min max 
Dependent variables 
      
 
Subsidy dummy 0.08 0.26 0.24 0.16 0 1 
 
Subsidy coverage 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.07 0 1 
 
ln(Subsidy coverage) -0.14 0.57 0.48 0.37 -5.79 0 
Explanatory variables 
 
     
 
R&D dummy
 t-1 0.32 0.47 0.43 0.22 0 1 
 
R&D dummy
 0 0.33 0.47 0.47 0 0 1 
 
Size
 t-1 162 315 352 66 2 6,648 
 
Age 25 19 19 6 1 169 
 
Technological sophistication 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.06 0 1 
 
Domestic exporter dummy
 t-1 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.21 0 1 
 
Foreign capital dummy 0.18 0.38 0.37 0.12 0 1 
 
Market power dummy
 t-1 0.31 0.46 0.41 0.24 0 1 
The variable ln(Subsidy coverage) is the natural logarithm of subsidy coverage for 
subsidy coverages greater than zero and zero for subsidy shares equal to zero. Notice 
that the variable size takes values lower than 10 for some observations despite the 
fact that the ESEE only incorporates firms with more than 9 workers. This is because 
once incorporated in the survey some firms decrease below 9 employees. 
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Table 3A. Subsidy regressions used to calculate expected subsidy coverage 
Sample used in the 
regressions: 
Subsidy 
applicants 
Subsidized 
firms 
Subsidy 
applicants All firms  
Subsidized 
firms 
Dependent variable: 
Successful 
applicant 
dummy 
ln(Subsidy 
coverage) 
Successful 
applicant 
dummy 
Subsidy  
dummy 
ln(Subsidy 
coverage) 
Parameters estimated: 
1λ  2λ  3λ  4λ  5λ  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Subsidy dummy t-1 1.08 (0.11)***   1.57 (0.11)*** 2.00 (0.06)***   
Subsidy dummy 0 1.31 (0.16)***         
ln(subsidy coverage) t-1   0.24 (0.04)***     0.45 (0.04)*** 
ln(subsidy coverage) 0   0.55 (0.04)***       
No subsidy dummy t-1   -0.56 (0.10)***     -0.83 (0.09)*** 
No subsidy dummy 0   -0.85 (0.11)***       
R&D dummy
 t-1 0.30 (0.15)** -0.42 (0.13)***       
R&D dummy
 0 0.06 (0.15) -0.29 (0.12)**       
Size
 t-1 0.00 (0.00)* -0.00 (0.00)** 0.00 (0.00)** 0.00 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00)** 
Age 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Tech. sophistication 0.87 (0.38)** 0.16 (0.16) 1.18 (0.39)*** 1.10 (0.15)*** -0.10 (0.18) 
Domestic exporter
 t-1 0.22 (0.14) -0.11 (0.09) 0.28 (0.13)** 0.42 (0.05)*** -0.10 (0.10) 
Foreign capital dummy 0.10 (0.17) -0.13 (0.09) 0.10 (0.16) 0.22 (0.07)*** -0.26 (0.10)** 
Market power dummy
 t-1 0.02 (0.11) 0.12 (0.06)** 0.04 (0.10) 0.17 (0.05)*** -0.03 (0.06) 
Constant -0.21 (0.45) 0.06 (0.24) 0.11 (0.45) -2.93 (0.20)*** -0.93 (0.23)*** 
           
Industry, region and 
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
           
σ  
 0.92   1.01 
      
Estimation method Probit OLS Probit Probit OLS 
# of observations 1,585 1,082 1,585 14,278 1,082 
# of firms 588 411 588 2,619 411 
R2  0.39   0.26 
Pseudo R2 0.44  0.36 0.45  
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Firm-clustered-robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is a dummy variable with value one 
for successful applicants and value zero for rejected applicants. The dependent variable in column (4) is a dummy 
variable with value one for successful applicants and value zero for the remaining firms in the sample (rejected 
applicants and non-applicants). The dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is the natural logarithm of the subsidy 
coverage. 19 industry dummies, 16 region dummies and 12 year dummies have been included. 
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Table 4A. Descriptive statistics of the actual subsidy coverage and 
the different measures of expected subsidy coverage 
  standard deviation   
 mean overall between within min max 
 
      
 
All firms in the sample (N=14,283) 
  0.02 0.10 0.09 0.07 0 1 


 
0.02 0.09 0.09 0.05 0 0.99 

 _1 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.06 0 1 

 _2 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.04 0 0.85 
 
      
 
All applicants (N=1,585) 
  0.19 0.25 0.23 0.15 0 1 


 
0.21 0.17 0.18 0.06 0.01 0.99 

 _1 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.03 1 

 _2 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.08 0 0.85 
 
      
 
Successful applicants (N=1,082) 
  0.28 0.25 0.24 0.16 0 1 


 
0.26 0.19 0.19 0.07 0.02 0.99 

 _1 0.26 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.03 1 

 _2 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.09 0 0.85 
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